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It has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric
perspective (e.g., the out-of-body experience, OBE) reﬂect speciﬁc biases in exocentric
perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, we examined
whether such biases in perspective-taking were present in relation to speciﬁc dissociative
anomalous body experiences (ABE) – namely the OBE. Participants also completed
the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000) which provided
measures of additional embodied ABE (unreality of self) and measures of derealization
(unreality of surroundings).There were no reliable differences in the level of ABE, emotional
numbing, and anomalies in sensory recall reported between the OBE and control group
as measured by the corresponding CDS subscales. In contrast, the OBE group did
provide signiﬁcantly elevated measures of derealization (“alienation from surroundings”
CDS subscale) relative to the control group. At the same time we also found that the
OBE group was signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient at completing all aspects of the perspective-
taking task relative to controls. Collectively, the current ﬁndings support fractionating
the typically unitary notion of dissociation by proposing a distinction between embodied
dissociative experiences and disembodied dissociative experiences – with only the latter
being associated with exocentric perspective-taking mechanisms. Our ﬁndings – obtained
with an ecologically valid task and a homogeneous OBE group – also call for a re-
evaluation of the relationship between OBEs and perspective-taking in terms of facilitated
disembodied experiences.
Keywords: perspective-taking, anomalous bodily experiences, out-of-body experience, dissociation,
depersonalization
INTRODUCTION
Stable self-consciousness, which supports appropriate behavior
and experience, is dependent on a legion of multi-sensory co-
ordinated processes acting in concert to maintain a coherent sense
of the embodied self over space and time. These underlying pro-
cesses include the multi-sensory spatial coding of both one’s own
body, the environment, and the constant interactions between
body and environment. However, this typically stable process can
break down in certain circumstances, leading to striking distor-
tions in body-image and dissociative anomalous body experiences
(ABE). One such hallucination that has received growing interest
in recent years is the out-of-body experience (OBE).
The OBE can be deﬁned as an experience where the individual
“perceives his/her environment from a perspective outside of their
physical body.” Therefore, a fundamental core aspect to the OBE is
the overwhelming sense that one is experiencing the world from
and external, exocentric perspective (Eastman, 1962; Green, 1968;
Palmer, 1978; Blackmore, 1982; Irwin, 1985). In this sense OBE
has been discussed in relation to deliberate processes of egocentric
transformation and perspective-taking (e.g., Blanke et al., 2005;
Braithwaite and Dent, 2011).
The current and dominant view is that the OBE occurs due
to a temporary disruption in multi-sensory integration processes,
where stable egocentric processing has become impaired to such
an extent that it can no longer represent a coherent sense of
embodied “self” (see Blanke and Arzy, 2005; Blanke and Mohr,
2005; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 for reviews). Although it is not
entirely clear how such transient disruptions occur (even more so
in non-clinical samples), other independent ﬁndings have shown
that OBE groups can display; (i) elevated scores on measures
of anomalous experience related to disruptions in temporal-lobe
processing; (ii) biases in body-transformation/perspective-taking
processes; and (iii) elevated signs of visual cortical hyperexcitabil-
ity – which were absent from both control groups and non-visual
hallucination groups (Braithwaite et al., 2011, 2013a,b).
In addition, behavioral studies have argued that the brain pro-
cesses involved in the mental transformation of one’s own body
may be the same as those implicated in the computation of an exo-
centric perspective (for review, see Kessler and Rutherford, 2010;
Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Kessler and Wang, 2012; Popescu
and Wexler, 2012; van Elk and Blanke, 2013) and particularly in
the OBE (Cook and Irwin, 1983; Blackmore, 1987; Brugger, 2002;
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Blanke and Arzy, 2005; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Mohr
et al., 2006; Easton et al., 2009; Overney et al., 2009; Braithwaite
et al., 2011). Most of the latter studies used performance at the
“own-body-transformation” (OBT) task to explore perspective-
taking and have implicated the temporal–parietal junction in the
mental transformation of one’s own body and perspective (see
Blanke et al., 2005). However, only a handful of these studies actu-
ally explored performance on this task in direct relation to samples
reporting OBEs – and these have produced diverse results (Easton
et al., 2009; Braithwaite et al., 2011).
Interestingly, impairments and not beneﬁts, at OBT tasks have
been shown for participants who scored positively on a mea-
sure of perceptual aberrations related to schizotypy (Mohr et al.,
2006) and more recently for those speciﬁcally reporting OBEs
(Braithwaite et al., 2011; though see also Easton et al., 2009). These
tasks present observers with a schematic ﬁgure which is either fac-
ing the observer or facing away from the observer. Participants
are instructed to try to adopt the perspective of the ﬁgure and
hence engage perspective-taking processes and decide on what
hand (left/right) the ﬁgurewearing a distinctive glove and bracelet.
Although these taskswere originally thought tomeasure similar
perspective-taking mechanisms to that implicated in the out-of-
body perspective, ﬁndings where schizotypes and OBE groups
were impaired at the task, appear to go against the intuitive
idea that those reporting dissociative experience should be bet-
ter at exocentric perspective-taking.Whether the typical OBT task
truly is an exocentric perspective-taking task has now been ques-
tioned on the grounds that with only two exemplar avatars, other
rule-based contingency strategies may be impacting more on per-
formance rather than exocentric perspective-taking (Braithwaite
and Dent, 2011; Gardner and Potts, 2011; Gronholm et al., 2012;
Kessler and Wang, 2012; May and Wendt, 2012; see also Pezzulo
et al., 2013).
Collectively, the evidence for clear beneﬁts in perspective-
taking, for those individuals prone to anomalous disembodied
and dissociative experiences, is currently unclear, contentious, and
awaiting clariﬁcation. This is likely due, in part, to; (i) diverse
methodologies used to examine such processes; (ii) not all previ-
ous studies claiming to explore the mechanisms of OBEs have
actually used OBE samples and; (iii) the use of other distinct
groups of hallucinators (e.g., schizotypes) that may themselves
reﬂect quite different underlying mechanisms that do not include
exocentric hallucinations. These different mechanisms may well
be masked as they currently exist under the generic umbrella con-
cept of “dissociative experience”not all of which would conceivably
index exocentric processes. As a consequence it becomes impor-
tant to examine the OBE not just in its own right, but alongside
other similar though distinct dissociative experiences.
Shedding light on this currently ambiguous situation will also
help our understanding of the embodied processes involved in
more deliberate forms of perspective-taking, where the social
and/or spatial goals might be conscious and deliberately chosen,
yet, where the actualmechanism for transforming the“ego”into an
exocentric perspective seems to be strongly embodied (Kessler and
Thomson, 2010) and compulsory rather than deliberately chosen
(Kessler and Wang, 2012), and might therefore strongly resemble
the spontaneous OBT underlying OBE.
DEPERSONALIZATION, DEREALIZATION, AND THE OBE
Early accounts for theOBE came frompsychiatry, where it was cast
as a speciﬁc instance of depersonalization (Noyes and Kletti, 1976,
1977). Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is a syndrome which
reﬂects a severe disruption in self-awareness that can include dis-
sociative experiences (Sierra and David, 2011). Depersonalization
itself typically refers to an unreality of the self. Patients classi-
cally describe feelings of remoteness, estrangement from the self,
feeling like a robot or automaton, and a ﬂattening of emotional
affect (Sierra, 2009; Sierra and David, 2011). The related concept
of derealization (DR) which can commonly co-occur with deper-
sonalization, refers more to an unreality of surroundings – where
patients typically describe experiencing the world through a fog,
a veil, a bubble and being “detached” from their surroundings
(Sierra and David, 2011).
The relationship between OBEs and DPD-DR has been ques-
tioned. For example, in the OBE the experience is often described
as being extremely vivid, convincing, striking, and very real.
Individuals often describe a heightened sense of awareness and
increased clarity of thought during the experience (see Blackmore,
1982). In contrast, DPD-DR experiences are often described as
having a dulled or ﬂattened affect, loss of emotional coloring, and
can be somewhat dreamlike (Gabbard et al., 1981, 1982; Twemlow
et al., 1982). In addition, DPD-DR experiences typically occur in
stressful situations, whereas the OBE can equally occur sponta-
neously in quite relaxed conditions. These phenomenological and
contextual differences have led to the view that OBEs and the ABE
reported in DPD-DR are not the same and may reﬂect quite dif-
ferent neurocognitive underpinnings (Gabbard et al., 1981, 1982;
Blackmore, 1982; Twemlow et al., 1982; Gabbard and Twemlow,
1984, 1986; see also Sierra, 2009 for a discussion).
There is some confusion over the terminology used when
describing the anomalous experiences reported by DPD-DR
patients that may contribute to continued misunderstandings
about the prevalence of OBEs in DPD-DR as well as the clin-
ical construct of DPD-DR itself (see Sierra and Berrios, 1997;
Medford et al., 2005 for detailed discussions). For example, while
some experiences might be described as “disembodied” or “disso-
ciative” OBEs themselves are rarely, if ever, reported by patients
with DPD-DR. What patients appear to be describing is that they
feel their bodies are unreal and do not belong to them. However,
a closer examination of these accounts shows that the perceiving
“self” is still typically described as being located inside the physical
self – so there is no external “disembodiment” or shift in experi-
ential perspective. The term “disembodiment” and perhaps to a
lesser extent “dissociation” can be taken to imply that DPD-DR
experiences commonly involve experiences where the perceiving
“self” shifts perspective from an egocentric and embodied one,
to an exocentric and disembodied one (an OBE). However, for
DPD-DR this is rare, so much so that some have noted the com-
plete absence of OBEs in DPD-DR patient populations (Sierra,
2009).
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The present study sought to examine cognitive biases in
perspective-taking/body-transformation processes that may be
implicated in predisposition to hallucinatory experiences that
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involve a shift in self-perspective (the OBE). If the striking
phenomenological aspects of OBEs are based in some form of
involuntary exocentric perspective-taking, then individuals prone
to OBEs may also display distinct performance in a deliberate
perspective-taking task. An intuitive prediction is that those prone
to OBEs would be better at a perspective-taking as they may
recruit the same transformational mechanisms underlying the
OBE. Although some previous research has shown the opposite
pattern, where OBE groups have shown impaired performance
(Braithwaite et al., 2011), the actual task employed in these stud-
ies has been questioned (Braithwaite and Dent, 2011; Braithwaite
et al., 2011).
Therefore, a new perspective-taking task was devised for this
study, where a human female avatar could be viewed from either
an “Above” viewpoint (above the head of the avatar) or “Below”
viewpoint (below the feet of the avatar). Thus, unlike many pre-
vious studies, here the avatar was rotated around the horizontal
axis and not the more typical vertical axis (or what some describe
as around the sagittal plane and not around the transverse plane;
Carpenter and Profﬁtt, 2001; Creem et al., 2001). In addition to
any transformation of plane/viewpoint required, half of the stim-
uli also required a (mental) rotation of the participant’s body in
order to fully transform and match their perspective to that of the
avatar (see Figure 1).
There were two advantages from these new manipulations.
Firstly, these manipulations produced eight separate avatars, four
from the above viewpoint and four from the below viewpoint, but
two of these four also differed in terms of requiring body-rotation.
Previous OBT tasks have typically used only exemplars with two
different body positions (e.g., facing/behind). As a consequence
the current study is arguably more resistant to the emergence
of non-spatial basic contingency-based or rule-based strategies
emerging across trials.
Secondly, the use of “Above” viewpoints is more phenomeno-
logically similar to the perspective reported in many visual OBEs
(see also Schwabe et al., 2009). As a consequence, the current
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli from the new Human-own-body-transformation
task (HOBT) where avatars from both ‘Above’ (top row) and ‘Below’
(bottom row) perspectives were used. Note, while all avatars require the
transformation of plane, the two avatars in the upper row/ left hand side,
and lower row right-hand side also require a rotation of body as well.
Therefore the stimuli are distinguishable along two a-priori dimensions, one
of plane and one of body-rotation.
perspective-taking transformations are more in line with those
implied in accounts of OBEs. Finally, the presence of both
a transformation of plane and body-rotation facilitates a sep-
arate exploration of these factors in relation to overall body
transformations, perspective-taking and spatial processing in
relation to OBEs.
In addition to the new behavioral tasks, all participants were
measured for their proneness to dissociative anomalous experi-
ences via the administration of the Cambridge Depersonalization
Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000), which contains measures
of both ABE and anomalous experiences of one’s surroundings
(derealization). As noted in the Introduction, there has been some
debate as to the relationship between depersonalization and OBEs
(Noyes and Kletti, 1976, 1977; Gabbard et al., 1981, 1982; Black-
more, 1982; Gabbard and Twemlow, 1984; see also Sierra, 2009).
However, there have been few, if any, experimental investigations
of these factors together. Importantly, the ABE measured by the
CDS are more related to embodied anomalous experiences, where
the self remains within the body and is not transposed into an
exocentric perspective. It is not at all clear whether OBE groups
also experience elevated levels of these potentially related expe-
riences or whether the OBE tends to occur in isolation to these
other experiences. In addition, the CDS also contains ameasure of
derealization, where individuals report being cut-off and alienated
from their surroundings. In light of recent accounts fromcognitive
neuroscience on the role of a breakdown inmulti-sensory integra-
tion underlying the OBE, any depletion or disruption in incoming
sensory signals from the outside worldmay act to destabilize inter-
nal models of the bodily self. As a consequence, the OBE group
maywell display elevated signs of derealization, evenmore so, than
the embodied ABE associated with depersonalization per se.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-two participants took part in the present study. Of these, 47
(82%) were female and 60 (96%) reported that they were right-
handed. None reported any personal medical history of seizure,
epilepsy or were diagnosed as having migraine. All participants
were undergraduate or postgraduate students (MSc/PhD) from
the School of Psychology at the University of Birmingham, UK.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 28 years (average age of 21.5
years). All received course credit for taking part in the study.
QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES
The Cambridge Depersonalization Scale
The CDS (Sierra and Berrios, 2000) is a 29-item psychometri-
cally established measure of dissociative anomalous experiences
associated with the construct of depersonalization (anomalous
experiences of the “self”) and derealization (anomalous experi-
ences of ones surroundings). Two responses to each question are
given on 5-point Likert scales, one response for “Frequency” and
one for “Duration” and the ﬁnal score for any item is the summed
output of both these responses (giving a potential range of scores
between 0 and 290).
It is nowrecognized that clinically signiﬁcant depersonalization–
derealization (DPD-DR) is best considered as a syndrome rather
than a single phenomenon (Sierra, 2009), since it involves
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alterations in the quality of subjective experience across a range
of different experiential domains (see, for example,Medford et al.,
2005). Although this multi-factorial understanding of DPD-DR
has been present in descriptive literature for many decades (see
also Ackner, 1954; Sierra and Berrios, 1997) it is only recently
that it has been conﬁrmed by empirical phenomenological studies
(Sierra et al., 2005; Simeon et al., 2008) which have examined the
clustering of CDS items into different factors. In the study by Sierra
et al. (2005), CDS items were shown to segregate into four distinct
factors, which the authors termed (i)ABE; (ii) emotional numbing
(EN, analogous to the term “de-affectualization”), (iii) anoma-
lous sensory recall (ASR), and (iv) alienation from surroundings
(AFS or derealization; Sierra et al., 2005). Previous research on
patients has shown that a cut-off point of 70 yields a sensitivity of
75% (speciﬁcity of 87%) and has high internal consistency (Cron-
bach’s alpha = 0.89) and half-split reliability (0.92; see Sierra and
Berrios, 2000; Sierra, 2009). Importantly, it should be noted that
there is no explicit question on the CDS for OBEs. The ABE ques-
tions typically describe anomalous states that are more associated
with embodied perceptions (see General Discussion for further
elaborations)1.
The OBE pre-screen
A pre-screen questionnaire to establish the presence of OBEs and
some basic phenomenological information about them was also
administered. This questionnaire has been used and detailed in
previous studies from our laboratory (Braithwaite et al., 2011,
2013a,b). Participants are initially asked the question: “Have you
ever had an experience where you have perceived/experienced the
world from a vantage point outside of the physical body?” In addi-
tion to this question participants were given further qualifying
information that (i) such an experience can feel totally real at
the time of the experience with all the phenomenological quali-
ties of veridical perception and (ii) that such experiences can be
ﬂeeting and transient or more sustained. If a response of “yes”
was provided then additional contextual and situational informa-
tion about the experience(s) was also ascertained such as how
often they had experienced an OBE, whether the experience was
visual in nature, whether they saw their physical self during the
experience, and the perspective from which they experienced the
world or self (above, below, in front, behind, laterally, or other).
Associated phenomenology was also documented (e.g., feelings of
dizziness, ﬂoating sensations, disorientation, dissociation, duality
of consciousness, other sensory experiences, etc). This question-
naire also allowed us to ensure the participant themselves had not
incorrectly deﬁned their own experiences as OBEs, when in fact
they might not be consistent with classical deﬁnitions.
PROCEDURE AND STIMULI: PERSPECTIVE-TAKING TASK
All participants took part in a newly devised version of a
perspective-taking task, which for clarity and conciseness we
1One question on the CDS does ask about feeling “as if” one is outside of the body
(question 23) however, this is not regarded as equivalent to the more direct question
of actually“perceiving”theworld froman external point of view. In addition, further
questioning with DPD patients reveals this is rarely, if ever, deﬁned as an OBE by
the patient.
now refer to as the Human OBT (HOBT) task. Unlike previ-
ous versions of the OBT task, the present stimuli consisted of
both aerial (elevated/above the avatars head) and low (beneath
the avatars feet) color photographic views of a human female
avatar. In each photograph, the avatar was wearing a distinc-
tive glove/bracelet on one hand. The avatar could be facing in
two directions (toward the top or bottom of the screen), from
either the elevated or beneath viewpoints, thus generating eight
possible exemplar photographs (four from each viewpoint) when
combined with the differing hands wearing the glove/bracelet. To
successfully solve the task the avatars differed on twomain a priori
dimensions.
For example, all avatars required a transformation of plane
where the viewpoint of the participant or the avatar itself could
be transformed. In addition, some of the avatars (see Figure 1)
also required an additional step of mental body-rotation in
order to match the perspectives between participant and avatar.
The a priori prediction was that reaction times (RTs) for those
avatars requiring the additional step would be increased. These
stimuli were presented centrally, at ﬁxation, against a white
background on an 17-inch Samsung CRT monitor coupled to a
Pentium PC. The stimuli are shown in Figure 1. The experiment
was programed in E-prime software v2.1 (Psychology Software
Tools).
The stimuli were viewed at an unﬁxed but general distance of
60 cm and were approximately 110 mmwide × 75 mm high. Each
trial beganwith the presentation of a black central ﬁxation cross on
a white background. The ﬁxation cross was presented for 1000 ms
followed by the presentation of the human avatar which remained
on the screen until response. There was an inter-stimulus interval
of 1000 ms between trials.
All stimuli were presented within one single block of 96 tri-
als (48 per perspective). Participants were instructed to imagine
themselves to be in the ﬁgure’s body position and to adopt
the appropriate perspective of the ﬁgure. Once done, they
had to respond to whether the glove was on the left hand
(up-arrow keyboard response) or right hand (down-arrow key-
board response) of the human avatar. The presentation of
the different stimuli was randomized within the experimental
block of trials. The experiment began with a separate block
of 16 practice trials which were not analyzed but used so that
participants could learn the correct response-mapping. Partic-
ipants were instructed to respond as fast and as accurately
as they could. The experiment lasted approximately 40 min
(including the administration of the questionnaires). The ques-
tionnaires were always completed after the perspective-taking
task.
RESULTS
For the perspective-taking task, RTs were made ﬁt for analysis in
the following way. Firstly, all incorrect responses were identiﬁed
and removed from the analysis. This revealed an overall response
accuracy rate of 94%. Secondly, all outliers (deemed at ±2.5 stan-
dard deviations from the mean) and responses faster than 200 ms
were also discarded. Any participant with less than 80% accuracy
at the task was also removed from the analysis. This procedure
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FIGURE 2 | Descriptive statistics (percentages) of those reporting OBEs in the high-groups of each subscale from the Cambridge Depersonalization
Scale (CDS).
led to ﬁve participants being removed from the analysis2. The
following analysis was carried out on the remaining sample of 57
participants. An overall measure of performance was calculated
where the proportion of correct responses was divided into the RTs
providing a measure of efﬁciency (Townsend and Ashby, 1983; see
also Rach et al., 2011). All statistical tests are reported two-tailed
and, where necessary, p-values have been corrected for multi-
ple comparisons (via the Bonferroni procedure) and corrected
degrees of freedom are reported if non-homogenous variability
occurred.
Of the remaining participants, 17 (30%) claimed to have
experienced an OBE at some point in their life. The remaining
70% made up the non-OBE control group. The OBE pre-screen
questionnaire revealed that the entire OBE group reported their
experiences had a strong visual component to them, where they
experienced themselves or their local environment from an exter-
nal and exocentric perspective. In addition, all reported an elevated
perspective to their experiences, as if they were looking down
on the world and/or themselves. Although other multi-sensory
information was also noted and contributed to the realism of
the experience (e.g., vestibular distortions/ﬂoating sensations)
in all cases these always co-occurred with visual aspects of the
experience.
CAMBRIDGE DEPERSONALIZATION SCALE
Overall summed scores were explored for normality via a Shapiro–
Wilk test and were found to be borderline non-normally dis-
tributed [W = 0.96 (df = 57), p < 0.05]. As a consequence, these
questionnaire data were explored with non-parametric statis-
tics. The overall sample mean score for the CDS was X¯ = 30.5
(median = 29.3, and range = 0–84). Two participants scored just
2All removed participants were from the control group. Exit questioning revealed
that some described the experiment as “too hard” so they did not engage fully with
the experiment and others that they were confused about the instructions.
above the score of 70 (scores of 71, 84) and one was borderline
(score of 66).
A median-split analysis was carried out independently on all
four subscales of the CDS and the percentage of those reporting
OBEs occurring in the high-groups of these subscales was calcu-
lated (see Figure 2). This revealed that the high-ABE and AFS
groups contained the largest numbers of those reporting OBEs.
Interestingly, these descriptive statistics show that 77% of those
reporting OBEs placed in the high-AFS group (i.e., increased signs
of derealization).
The mean CDS scores for all subscales and for both the
OBE group and non-OBE controls are graphically represented in
Figure 3. These differences were formally compared by a series of
Mann–Whitney U-tests. Although the largest effects appear to be
present for both ABE and AFS measures, after correction for mul-
tiple comparisons, only the difference between the groups for the
AFS subscale was signiﬁcant (U = 176.00, Z = −2.88, p< 0.005).
The OBE group produced signiﬁcantly higher scores on measures
of AFS (X¯ = 10.8, SE = 1.6) than the control non-OBE group
(X¯ = 5.2, SE = 1.2; see Figure 3). Although this general pattern
also held for measures of ABE (OBE X¯ = 11.8, SE = 1.8; non-OBE
control X¯ = 7.5, SE = 0.08), this was not reliable after correction
for multiple comparisons (U = 233.50, Z = −1.86, p = 0.08).
Seventy-seven percent of those claiming OBEs in the present
sample placed in the high-AFS group (suggesting that themajority
of this groupdisplayed elevated signs of derealization experiences).
In addition, theOBEgroup reported signiﬁcantly higher degrees of
AFS relative to the non-OBE control group. The effect for the OBE
group to display increased scores on measures of ABE, though
showing signs of being present, failed to be reliable. No other
factors reliably distinguished the groups.
PERFORMANCE AT THE HOBT TASK
Mean correct efﬁciency RTs for the HOBT task are plotted
in Figure 4. Performance at the HOBT task was examined
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FIGURE 3 | Mean CDS scores for each of the 4 subscales (identified by Sierra and Berrios, 2000) plotted for both the OBE and non-OBE control groups
(error bars = 1 SE).
FIGURE 4 | Efficiency RTs for the HOBT task plotted for both Groups (Controls and OBE group) both perspectives (Above and Below) and whether an
additional body-rotation was required or not (+ rot = requires body rotation / - rot = does not require body rotation: error bars = 1 SE).
by a 2 (Group: Controls vs OBE group) × 2 (Viewpoint
Above/Below)× 2 (Body rotation: Rotation vs No rotation)mixed
ANOVA applied to the efﬁciency RTs. The main effect of Group
was signiﬁcant, F(1, 55) = 24.33, p < 0.001; as was the main
effect of Viewpoint, F(1,55) = 30.70, p< 0.001. On the whole, the
OBE group was signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient (X¯diff = 528 ms) than
the non-OBE control group at the HOBT task. In addition, both
groups were signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient overall at Above view-
points, relative to below viewpoint (X¯diff = 264 ms). In contrast,
the main effect of Rotation was not signiﬁcant, F(1,55) = 1.67
p = 0.202 (X¯diff = 73 ms). TheViewpoint × Group and theView-
point × Rotation interactions were signiﬁcant, F(1,55) = 10.04,
p < 0.005; and F(1,55) = 15.64, p < 0.001, respectively. How-
ever, the Rotation × Group interaction was not signiﬁcant,
F(1,55) = 0.178, p = 0.674. Finally, the three-way interaction
between Group × Viewpoint × Rotation was not signiﬁcant, F(1,
55) = 1.40, p = 0.242.
The signiﬁcant interactions were explored further via a series
of within subjects t-tests carried out separately for each group, for
each viewpoint and rotation condition. These data are given in
Table 1.
To explore the overall cost of viewpoint between the groups, the
overall RTs from the “Above” viewpoint were subtracted from RTs
from the “Below”viewpoint for both the OBE and control groups.
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Table 1 | Breakdown of the separate effects ofViewpoint and Rotation
within the two groups.
Condition X¯ diff (ms) t -Statistic df p-Value
Controls: Above rot – No rot 146 2.79 39 <0.01*
Controls: Below rot – No rot −339 2.80 39 <0.01*
OBE group: Above rot – No rot 82 1.91 16 =0.07
OBE group: Below rot – No rot −180 3.42 16 <0.005*
* = results are signiﬁcant.
This generated two sets of difference scores. These differences
were explored via a between-subjects t-test which was signiﬁcant
[t(52.9)= 4.39, p< 0.001]. On the whole, non-OBE controls were
more impaired (by 298 ms) by the cost for below viewpoints than
the OBE group.
To summarize, both groups were more efﬁcient at the Above
viewpoint compared to the Below viewpoint. In addition, the OBE
group was signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient at all aspects of the HOBT
task relative to the non-OBE control group. For Above viewpoints,
there was a general trend for a cost to efﬁciency if an additional
body-rotation was required (in addition to any transformation of
plane) though this was only reliable for the control group. The
pattern of ﬁndings for Below viewpoints was reversed with, rather
surprisingly, efﬁciency being improved for those avatars thatmight
require an additional step of body-rotation as well as any transfor-
mation of plane. These ﬁndings are discussedmore fully in Section
“General Discussion.”
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study examined biases in exocentric perspective-
taking/body-transformation processes in relation to predispo-
sition to hallucinatory experiences that involve a shift in self-
perspective – the OBE. In addition, signs of embodied anoma-
lous experiences associated with depersonalization/derealization
(DPD-DR), with OBE groups, were also explored.
The OBE is, by deﬁnition, an anomalous experience revolving
around a shift in the perspective of the experiencing self “out-
side of his/her body.” In line with previous research (Blanke
et al., 2005; Braithwaite et al., 2011), a premise of the present
study was that if OBEs are based in some form of disrup-
tion in the mechanisms underlying stable egocentric processing
and/or the efﬁcient use of exocentric perspective-taking processes,
then these individuals may display distinct performance at a task
which is sensitive to these processes. In addition to this, we also
examined the rate and range of other dissociative anomalous expe-
riences to explore their association with the OBE and exocentric
perspective-taking.
There was a borderline signiﬁcant trend for the OBE group
to report more additional ABE relative to control groups. This
observation for a general trend of elevated egocentric ABEs (asso-
ciated with depersonalization) for the OBE group is new, though
complements other research showing increased somatoform dis-
tortions for these groups (Irwin, 2000; Murray and Fox, 2005).
Both the ABE subscale in the present study, and the somato-
form dissociation scale used by previous studies, include only
items related to either altered bodily sensations, or egocentric
dissociative experiences. Clearly, the OBE is a speciﬁc form of
exocentric ABE and can co-occur with other egocentric dissocia-
tive phenomenology. The weaker effects seen here for the ABE
subscale are possibly due to the fact that this is a small subscale of
items (much smaller than the full measures used in previous stud-
ies), containing items more focused on dissociative experiences,
rather than speciﬁc somatoform distortions (though the two can
be related).
In contrast to the pattern seen for all other subscales (ABE,
EN, ASR), the OBE group did provide clear and signiﬁcantly
elevated scores on measures of AFS (derealization) compared to
the non-OBE control group. Indeed, an exploratory median-split
analysis carried out on the whole sample revealed that 77% of
the OBE group fell in the high-scoring group for derealization.
The relationship between derealization and the OBE is both new
and interesting as it might imply that the OBE itself is a response
to a temporary lack of connection between the “self,” and the
surrounding world.
By this account, the speciﬁc neurocognitive biases underlying
derealization may increase the disconnection between the bodily
self and one’s own surroundings to such an extent that internal
representations of the body/self become unstable or degraded in
some way. At the very least, incoming sensory information may
become ambiguous under conditions of increased derealization.
The net consequence of this is that typically stable egocentric rep-
resentations of the self might become so disrupted that they can no
longer support coherent embodied conscious experience. Under
some circumstances this might simply result in the dissociative
anomalous experiences reported by DPD-DR patients and their
non-clinical counterparts (e.g., estrangement from the self, bodies
feeling unreal, surroundings feel dreamlike, dull, and deadened).
However, in other instances these situationsmay act as a catalyst for
OBEs providing the individual also displays additional cognitive
biases in exocentric perspective-taking. This in itself is noteworthy
and has implications for the broader debate on whether the OBE
is or is not related to DPD-DR (see Sierra et al., 2002; Sierra, 2009;
Sierra and David, 2011).
The observation that the OBE group were also signiﬁcantly
more efﬁcient at the objective HOBT perspective-taking task rel-
ative to the non-OBE control group is particularly noteworthy.
This was the case across all viewpoints and body-rotation permu-
tations of the stimuli. Both groups found the Above viewpoints
easier than the Below viewpoints (see also Schwabe et al., 2009
for similar ﬁndings with only control groups). This is to be
expected and likely reﬂects both a greater familiarity with seeing
bodies from elevated/above viewpoints and also the clear view
of the head/shoulder region may act as a useful anchor point
(e.g., Kessler and Rutherford, 2010), with which to carry out
the transformations necessary to complete the task efﬁciently and
successfully.
An unexpected result was the diverse role of the “Rota-
tion” factor across the different viewpoints. For Above views,
there was a general cost to efﬁciency if both a transformation
of the body and plane was required. This cost was signiﬁ-
cant for control groups, and borderline reliable for the OBE
group (see Table 1). This overall ﬁnding is in line with our
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a priori intuitive prediction that avatars involving two separate
transformations (of both plane and body) will be less efﬁ-
cient than those avatars only involving one transformation. The
exact opposite pattern occurred for below viewpoints, where
RTs were generally increased, but where efﬁciency was actually
beneﬁted by the apparent needs of both a transformation of
plane and body-rotation and hampered where apparently only
one transformation was required. This result is supported fur-
ther in that it was observed for both the OBE and control
groups.
One possible explanation is that for the “Below − Rotation”
condition, and this condition alone, participants may not be car-
rying out the spatial transformation in a similar manner to the
other instances. For example, for both “Above” viewpoints, a clear
and familiar view is provided and a salient anchor point (i.e.,
the head) contribute to the transformations required to efﬁciently
solve the task at hand. Here, either a transformation of plane, of
body-rotation, or both are required. It is also, due to the familiar
perspective, quite salient which of these processes are best suited
to the situation.
However, the “Below − Rotation” condition, presents a view
of an avatar which we rarely, if ever experience in daily life: it
would require us either looking up at people through a glass
ﬂoor, or watching superman ﬂying over our heads. In contrast,
the “Below + Rotation” condition is identical to a person lying
on a bed, thus, a quite familiar view. We therefore suggest that
in the “Below − Rotation” condition, instead of a simple trans-
formation of plane, participants may ﬁrst rotate the whole avatar
(like hands rotating on a clock face), in order to place the head
toward the top, but in so doing, this now generates the need for an
additional body-rotation. Therefore this condition may actually
elicit two rotational strategies rather than our assumed one trans-
formation – thus impacting on the efﬁciency of performance. As
suggested, this may be due to the absence of a salient anchor point
and unusual view of the human body with which to assign the
appropriate initial transformation (e.g., Grabowski, 1999; Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010).
EMBODIED AND DISEMBODIED DISSOCIATIVE ANOMALOUS
EXPERIENCES
The present study provides preliminary evidence for fraction-
ating the unitary notion of “dissociation” underlying ABE. We
suggest that one important factor for consideration when examin-
ing the mechanisms underlying dissociative states is whether the
dissociation being examined is from an egocentric or “embodied”
perspective or whether it is from an exocentric or “disembod-
ied” perspective (or indeed both; e.g., as in cases of heautoscopy;
Brugger et al., 1997; Brugger, 2002). As a consequence it might
be helpful to conceptually view the legion of dissociative states
of the self as being representative of either “embodied disso-
ciation” (e.g., dissociative experiences reported in deperson-
alization, schizophrenic loss of body boundaries, autoscopy,
sensed-presence experiences) where the perceiving “self” remains
ﬁrmly located within the physical body, or “disembodied dis-
sociation” (i.e., OBEs) where the perceiving self appears lib-
erated from its egocentric physical moorings. Only the lat-
ter implies a bias for additional exocentric perspective-taking
processes underlying the phenomenology of the anomalous
experience3,4.
Although speculative, this view is supported by ﬁndings from
the present study as well as the broader literature. The crucial and
major difference between the groups in the current investigation
appears to have been the presence of exocentric OBEs, which may
have resulted from the co-presence of elevated signs of derealiza-
tion and biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. It was
clearly the case that the OBE group experienced other forms of
egocentric ABEs, but the presence of these additional egocentric
ABEs did not appear to be as strongly related to performance at
the exocentric perspective-taking task.
Therefore, although theOBEgroupwas a groupwhich reported
additional non-exocentric ABEs, performance at the HOBT task
appeared to be related more to the co-presence of disembodied
dissociative experiences that may well have been reliant on an exo-
centric representation of the self in space (the OBE). The control
group, by deﬁnition, did not report any instances of disembodied
dissociative experiences. In addition, their performance at the exo-
centric perspective-taking task was signiﬁcantly less efﬁcient than
that of the OBE group.
Interestingly, Sierra (2009) notes that while the concept of dis-
embodiment does imply an experience where the“self” is localized
outside one’s physical body (analogous to the OBE), in cases of
depersonalization, disembodiment is certainly not taken to imply
a shift in perspective of the experiencing self at all. Instead, with
depersonalization, patients describe “not really being there” in
an egocentric sense – but do not claim to occupy any external
perspective. This supports our argument here that terms like dis-
embodiment and dissociation require a more considered usage
when examining cases of OBEs relative to seemingly similar sit-
uations like DPD-DR. It would appear that there has been some
equivocation over the use of terms like disembodiment over the
years which, in no small way, has contributed to confusion over
depersonalization and other ABE.
Sierra’s (2009) salient observation shows that the term “dis-
embodiment” has often been taken to describe both; (i) what is,
in reality, a reduction in saliency of the embodied sense of self
– where one is still embodied (egocentrically), but this is greatly
weakened/diluted as well as; (ii) being completely disembodied
(exocentrically) into another spatial location (the OBE). Because
both these factors can occur together and can be dissociated, we
recommend abandoning using the term disembodiment for both
cases and those representing the former situation.
The revised taxonomy argued for here would help navigate
around such confusion, as the concept of disembodiment would
only be used for instances where exocentric perspectives are
3This suggestion assumes that the term“disembodied”be interpreted more literally.
By this taxonomy, one cannot have an egocentric disembodied experience, but one
can have an egocentric dissociative experience.
4Importantly, “embodied dissociation” and “disembodied dissociation” are not being
argued to be absolute – more so that these processes likely co-exist as relative biases
– where one dictates and deﬁnes anomalous conscious experience at any given
time. For example, while primarily disembodied, OBEs can consist of a minor co-
awareness of the physical self. Nonetheless, disembodied processes dominate the
phenomenology and realism of the experience. Exploring the presence, degree, and
interplay of such biases, across different OBEs and associated experiences, will be
an exciting avenue for future research.
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experienced and dominate consciousness. As a consequence of
this redeﬁnition, ABEs described by patients with DPD-DRwould
not be deﬁned as disembodied – though they are clearly disso-
ciative. In other words, one can be dissociated from the self (i.e.,
estranged from the self) while not necessarily being disembodied
from the self.
One argument against this position might be instances where
patients may describe no salient experiential perspective, and
instances of heautoscopy – where dual egocentric and exocentric
perspectives appear to co-exist, are thus not easily accommodated
within this re-description. However, our conception is supported
by a clear division in empirical performance at a more objective
behavioral task, and not just subjective reports in interviews or
via questionnaire measures. In addition, the proposed concep-
tion does help to; (i) differentiate many dissociative experiences
from a variety of neurological, clinical, and psychotic conditions;
(ii) adds clarity to the confusion surrounding the nature of ABE
in depersonalization; (iii) more clearly highlights the important
differences between ABE in depersonalization and the OBE, and;
(iv) implicates the possible presence or absence of certain neural
networks (exocentric perspective-taking/self-perspective inhibi-
tion). Furthermore, identifying experiences that lie outside of
these boundaries is still helpful for the development of scientiﬁc
theory.
In terms of the actualmechanismsmediating the increased efﬁ-
ciency seen for participants predisposed to OBEs, one may think
of these simply as an increased ability in exocentric perspective-
taking per se (i.e., the ability to simply adopt an external point
of view). However although intellectually seductive, to some
extent these ﬁndings may also index a greater ability to sup-
press the egocentric point of view. There is growing evidence
for the existence of both mechanisms of self-perspective inhibi-
tion (Vorauer and Ross, 1999; Ruby and Decety, 2004; Samson
et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2011) and the excitation of exo-
centric perspectives (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Saxe et al., 2006;
Lambrey et al., 2008; see also Zacks et al., 1999, 2000). These
may work in concert to achieve exocentric representations under-
lying striking and convincing multi-sensory hallucinations of
the self like the OBE. Both processes may also enjoy diverse
neurocognitive underpinnings. One prediction here is that self-
perspective inhibition may not, on its own, be sufﬁcient for an
OBE to occur. Under these circumstances, individuals may sim-
ply report embodied dissociative experiences (e.g., estrangement
from the self or “not being there”). The disembodied dissociative
experiences reported by those having OBEs may require addi-
tional, alternative and exocentric representations of the self in
space.
Interestingly, uniting these themes into a coherent and more
comprehensive account of dissociative experiences might also
help illuminate theories of both depersonalization and OBEs.
For example, as dissociative ABEs reported in depersonalization
appear to be entrenched in egocentric/embodied representa-
tions, they might reﬂect an increased and aberrant weight-
ing of internal bodily experiences (perhaps in an attempt to
re-establish the egocentric self which is disintegrating). This
aberrant weighting or attentional-shift directed toward inter-
nal bodily sensations may itself increase the saliency of internal
and interoceptive body-sensations and thus contribute to some
of the embodied ABEs reported by DPD-DR patients. This
would also be consistent with the observation that clinical cases
of DPD-DR have identiﬁed the presence of hyperreﬂexivity –
where some patients can become obsessive and display an aber-
rant focus on bodily sensations (Medford et al., 2005; Sierra,
2009; Sass et al., 2013). Similar observations have been made
in studies showing that OBE groups can also display increased
signs of somatoform dissociation/distortion, revolving around
a heightened and magniﬁed sense of self and self-consciousness
(Murray and Fox, 2005).
Such a shift to internal representations might also contribute
to altered experiences of one’s own surroundings, as attention and
processing would be drawn away from processing salient external
signals. Conceivably this might contribute, in part, to the nature
of the particular phenomenological characteristics of derealiza-
tion experiences (e.g., observers feel cut-off/detached from the
world). If the observer does not have access to additional biases in
exocentric representational systems, then they remain embodied,
but dissociated and depersonalized. However, in other cases where
aberrant activation in exocentric representations also contribute
to the experience, which are also temporarily more stable than
disrupted egocentric and embodied representations, then an OBE
might be more likely to develop.
The present ﬁndingsmay also speak in someway to the ongoing
debate over the concepts of depersonalization and derealization –
where it has been argued that “pure” cases of derealization are
rare in the clinical literature and thus it may not actually reﬂect a
separate construct (see Sierra et al., 2002). Although our present
ﬁndings are based only on two of the four measures from the
CDS, the current ﬁndings do imply a stronger effect for derealiza-
tion (relative to the ABEs associated more with the construct of
depersonalization) in relation to OBEs. This provides some tenta-
tive support for the view that derealization experiences may well
reﬂect distinct underlying mechanisms, at least for non-clinical
hallucinators.
REMAINING ISSUES
Although there are many variants of perspective-taking tasks
in the literature, it is not always clear-cut that the processes
required to complete them successfully necessarily recruit exo-
centric perspective-taking. For example, Braithwaite and Dent
(2011) were the ﬁrst to have questioned these assumptions
in relation to the evidence recruited for the standard OBT
task used by Blanke and colleagues to examine disruptions in
body-transformation/perspective-taking processes (e.g., Blanke
et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2006; Easton et al.,
2009). One limitation with these earlier incarnations of the OBT
task is that it typically recruited only two perspectives in the
exemplar stimuli and alternative strategies could easily be devel-
oped and used within a block of trials (see also Gardner and
Potts, 2011; Gronholm et al., 2012; Kessler and Wang, 2012;
May and Wendt, 2012; see also Pezzulo et al., 2013). Although
often empirical, it is important to remain aware of the differ-
ent transformational processes (e.g., perspective-taking, object-
rotation, if/then strategies) that may be apparent in a given task
(Hegarty andWaller, 2004).
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These limitations should also be considered in relation to the
current task. In the context of the current debate it is important
to ask if; (i) the tasks used can be reasonably assumed to mea-
sure rotational processes (either exocentric perspective-taking, or
mental rotation); and (ii) that these particular mechanisms are
functionally implicated in disembodied dissociative experiences
(i.e., the OBE). Although always problematic to separate, some of
the current ﬁndings do suggest that rotational/transformational
processes, more than alternative non-transformational ones, are
indeed playing a role in the current task.
For example, the main effects of Viewpoint, the View-
point × Rotation, and Viewpoint × Group interactions would
not be expected from some basic form of if/then rule or simi-
lar trial-by-trial strategy. These components should be irrelevant
to such rule-based strategies. The current HOBT task used two
different body positions, from two different viewpoints, and not
just a binary viewpoint manipulation (as has been the case with a
number of studies; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006;Mohr et al.,
2006; Easton et al., 2009). So the development of alternative strate-
gies, while not impossible, would have to cope with much greater
trial-by-trial unpredictability, impairing basic contingency-based
and rule-based strategies. In addition, it is not at all clear how or
why such contingency-based strategies could explain the effects of
Group also seen in the present ﬁndings – unless it is argued that
such non-spatial strategies relate to the mechanisms underlying
the exocentric OBE in some meaningful way.
Furthermore, previous independent investigations that have
used the standard OBT task have reported signiﬁcant costs to RT
performance, not beneﬁts, for both OBE samples (Braithwaite
et al., 2011) and those showing elevated signs of perceptual aber-
rations linked to schizotypy (Mohr et al., 2006). This is in contrast
to the large and signiﬁcant improvements to task efﬁciency found
in the present study. Collectively, these ﬁndings suggest that the
present HOBT task is both methodologically improved and not
equivalent to the performance reported for the more traditional
version of the task.
Whether the current task predominantly recruits object-
rotation or exocentric perspective-taking in the form of mental
self-rotation (e.g., Kessler and Thomson, 2010) remains to be
explored with future experimentation. In fact, different condi-
tions of the HOBT task may have triggered different strategies
of object- vs. self-rotation. We have argued that the condition
with the longest RTs, the “Below − Rotation” condition, may
have required an initial rotation of the avatar into a more famil-
iar orientation, which is an example of mental object-rotation,
while the subsequent steps in this condition as well as the default
transformations in the other three conditions may have consisted
in mental self-rotation. This is clearly speculative but could be
resolved in future studies making use of posture manipulations.
Kessler and colleagues (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and
Thomson, 2010; Kessler andWang, 2012) have recently shown that
a bodyposture that anticipates thedirectionofmental self-rotation
(akin to exocentric perspective-taking) facilitates the transforma-
tion,while an incongruent posture delays the process. Importantly,
body posture does not affect mental object-rotation (Kessler and
Thomson, 2010, Experiment 3). This pattern of results could help
in shedding light on the processes engaged by OBE participants
during exocentric perspective-taking (i.e., would they show a pos-
ture congruency effect or not?). According to their symptomology
of perceiving themselves outside their body, we would expect
them to engage in self-rotation/exocentric perspective-taking
rather than object-rotation whenever possible, making them the
highly efﬁcient perspective takers we observed in the current
study.
Finally, the current ﬁndings also have important bearings on
perspective processing in social interactions. Firstly, an intrigu-
ing future research question will be if and how OBE participants
make use of their efﬁcient perspective-taking skills during social
interaction: are they more inclined to adopt another’s per-
spective in conversation than control participants or are their
perspective-taking skills rather conﬁned to visuo-spatial scenarios
and completely independent of a social context? We believe that
the latter is unlikely in the light of our current ﬁndings. In addition
and on an anecdotal point, as part of our research programs into
anomalous experiences, we have encountered some participants
with social phobias/agoraphobias that have reported learning to
consciously will and “use” the disembodied viewpoint of the OBE
to manage stressful social situations. Here the experience makes
the observer feel removed from the direct social context causing
stressful reactions.
Bymoving away fromthe schematic drawings of the classicOBT
task (which have producedmixed results andmight not index exo-
centric perspective-taking) toward more naturalistic photographs
of bodies in more varied postures in space, we have enhanced
the task’s social dimension especially since these changes have
increased the likelihood that motor resonance mechanisms are
engaged in order to process difﬁcult body postures (cf. Kessler and
Miellet, 2013).
In social interaction, the latter often takes on the form of
implicit mimicry, i.e., the so-called “chameleon effect,” which has
been shown to enhance pro-social behavior and attitudes (e.g.,
Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2009; for review,
see Niedenthal et al., 2005). Furthermore, direct effects of pos-
ture, posture resonance, and other body-related processes on the
speed of egocentric transformations have been recently shown by
Kessler and Thomson (2010, especially Experiment 4) and oth-
ers (e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2008; Falconer and Mast, 2012;
van Elk and Blanke, 2013). Therefore, investigating embodied
perspective-taking during realistic social interaction in relation
to dissociative traits (e.g., embodied vs. disembodied dissocia-
tive experiences) could be a somewhat contra-intuitive, yet highly
interesting addition to the ﬁeld of social cognitive neuroscience.
CONCLUSION
The present study investigated biases in perspective-taking pro-
cesses that may be implicated in predisposition to hallucinatory
experiences that involve a shift in self-perspective (the OBE).
The OBE group were much more efﬁcient at a perspective-taking
task relative to a control group – supporting the view that the
prevalence of the OBE is associated with biases in perspective-
taking ability. In addition, the OBE group displayed signiﬁcantly
more signs of derealization experiences – which we speculate may
underlie a propensity to experience ambiguous sensory informa-
tion from the outside world and may contribute to destabilize the
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typically coherent sense of self. The current ﬁndings also support
a fractionating of the unitary notion of dissociation relative to
whether embodied or disembodied dissociative experiences are
reported. Future studies are planned to investigate the role of
both self-perspective inhibition and exocentric perspective-taking
underlying these and other related ABEs.
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